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Relativistic protocols have been proposed to overcome some impossibility results in clas-
sical and quantum cryptography. In such a setting, one takes the location of honest players
into account, and uses the fact that information cannot travel faster than the speed of light
to limit the abilities of dishonest agents. For example, various relativistic bit commitment
protocols have been proposed [1, 2]. Although it has been shown that bit commitment
is sufficient to construct oblivious transfer [3], composing specific relativistic protocols in
this way is known to be insecure [4, Appendix A]. A composable framework is required to
perform such a modular security analysis, but no known frameworks can handle models of
computation in Minkowski space.
By instantiating the systems model from the Abstract Cryptography framework [5] with
Causal Boxes [6], we obtain such a composable framework, in which messages are assigned a
location in Minkowski space (or superpositions thereof). This allows us to analyse relativistic
protocols and to derive novel possibility and impossibility results. We show that (1) coin
flipping can be constructed from the primitive channel with delay, (2) biased coin flipping,
bit commitment and channel with delay are all impossible without further assumptions, and
(3) it is impossible to improve a channel with delay. Note that the impossibility results also
hold in the computational and bounded storage settings. This implies in particular non-
composability of all proposed relativistic bit commitment protocols, of bit commitment in
the bounded storage model [7], and of biased coin flipping [8].
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1 Introduction
What this paper is about. We address construction of resources1 (e.g., an ideal coin flip or bit com-
mitment) in relativistic quantum cryptography, and security definitions that are robust under composition
of constructions. We prove new constructibility and impossibility results. By “relativistic” we mean basic
special relativity: Minkowski space-time with limited signalling speed.
A cryptographic resource: bit commitment. To illustrate the need for a composable analysis of
relativistic quantum cryptography, we focus on bit commitment protocols, which have attracted interest
in recent years [1, 2, 10, 11]. Bit commitment is a crucial cryptographic primitive, from which we can
construct oblivious transfer2 [3], multi-party computation2 [3], coin flipping [12], and zero-knowledge
proofs [13].
A bit commitment protocol (BC) between two players (say Alice and Bob) typically involves two
phases. In the commit phase, Alice commits to a bit a ∈ {0, 1} with Bob by exchanging information
with him. In the open phase, Alice chooses to open her commitment to Bob and reveals her bit to
him through an exchange of information. Intuitively speaking, security of bit commitment has two
requirements:
Hiding: when Alice is honest, Bob has no information about a before the open phase.
Binding: when Bob is honest, Alice must not be able to change the value of a between the commit and
open phases without him detecting her malicious behavior.
These requirements can be formalized under different security definitions. Not all models of security
of BC are composable: for example the -weakly binding definition of [11] is not. There, Alice is allowed
to commit to a bit without knowing its value, which if used as a subroutine in a coin flipping protocol,
would allow dishonest players to perfectly correlate the coin flips from different coins. Similar weaknesses
in current definitions of relativistic bit commitment have been exploited to show that using these protocols
as subroutine in a larger cryptosystem is insecure [4, Appendix A]. In this work, we model security such
that the constructed BC resource can be securely used in arbitrary context. Let us first review some
known results.
Impossiblity of classical bit commitment. In 2001, Canetti and Fischlin showed that construct-
ing a BC resource without any setup assumptions is impossible [14]. They proved this for a classical
non-relativistic setting through a classical man-in-the-middle attack (MITM). Consider a cheating Alice
simultaneously running two BC protocols: one with Bob, in which she is the committer, and one with
Charlie, in which she is the receiver. She can commit to Charlie’s bit with Bob by simply forwarding
their messages to each other during the commit phase. Note that the proof from [14] is restricted to the
classical setting, and does not imply the impossibility of constructing a BC resource in either quantum
or relativistic settings.
Impossibility of quantum bit commitment. Using a stand-alone definition with information-theoretic
security, Mayers, and Lo and Chau [15–17] independently showed between 1996 and 1997 that no secure
1The Abstract Cryptography framework [5] views cryptography as a resource theory: a protocol constructs a resource
(e.g. a system that produces a random coin flip) from some other resource (e.g. a system that allows bit commitment). In
the Universal Composability framework [9], resources correspond to ideal functionalities.
2Constructing oblivious transfer (and thus multi-party computation) from bit commitment holds only in the quantum
case [3].
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quantum bit commitment protocol can be constructed without further assumptions (for example regarding
the operations that (dishonest) parties can perform on their systems), because due to Uhlmann’s theorem,
if Bob cannot distinguish between the commitment to a 0 or a 1, then there exists a unitary on Alice’s
system allowing her to change the commitment from 0 to 1. Possibility results are obtained by restricting
the adversary’s capabilities. For example, Unruh showed in [18] that if the adversary has bounded
quantum memory, bit commitment that is composable in certain restricted settings is possible.3 In [19]
Unruh also shows that everlasting quantum bit commitment is achievable, if we assume signature cards
as trusted setup.
Relativistic protocols. In the hope of avoiding such attacks without making unproven assumptions on
the adversary’s capabilities, one turns to relativistic protocols and imposes relativistic causal constraints
on agents located in Minkowski space—no-signalling between space-like separated agents and a maximum
propagation speed for signals. An example is Kent’s 2012 relativistic BC protocol [1], which is immune
to the Mayers-Lo-Chau attack, since the sender splits into two space-like separated agents who can no
longer perform suitable unitaries on their joint systems. Like other relativistic BC protocols, this protocol
implements a timed commitment which is secure only within a time window given by the time taken
by light to travel between remote agents. However, it only satisfies a non-composable, weakly-binding
security definition [11]. As we will see, this protocol is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack and
therefore cannot be securely run as a subroutine in arbitrary protocols.
Composability of relativistic protocols. In relativistic settings, the existing negative results are ob-
tained by analyzing specific examples of protocols and attacks where composition fails [4, 11]. However,
without an overall coherent framework for modelling composability in relativistic cryptography, it is
impossible to obtain general positive and negative results.
1.1 Overview and scope of our results
In this work we introduce a framework for modelling composable cryptographic security in the presence of
classical, quantum and no-signalling adversaries, and apply it to prove new positive and negative results in
relativistic quantum cryptography. We do this by modelling the abstract information-processing systems
of the Abstract Cryptography framework [5] as Causal Boxes [6], which we instantiate with Minkowski
space-time. Our framework can also be applied to situations where agents exchange a superposition of
different numbers of messages in a superposition of orders in time, and provides an operational formalism
for studying indefinite causal structures.
We analyse three cryptographic resources, defined in Section 2. Coin flipping (CF , including biased
variations) and bit commitment (BC) are standard in the composable security literature, though in this
work our formalization involves space-time—inputs and outputs are produced at certain locations in
Minkowski space. We also introduce a channel with delay (CD), which is motivated by the fact that in
relativistic bit commitment protocols, the commitment is automatically opened after some (predefined)
time, thus resembling a CD more than a BC.4 The following results are summarized Fig. 1.
3The model used in [18] does not guarantee security when a protocol is composed with itself. There is thus no
contradiction with the impossibility proof for bit commitment in the bounded storage model in this work, which shows that
any bit commitment protocol run in parallel with another instance if itself is insecure.
4There may be different ways of modeling a relativistic bit commitment resource, e.g., the committer may have the
option of aborting before the commitment is opened, see the discussion in Sec. 2.3.3.
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Figure 1: Summary of our results. We assume Minkowski space-time with limited speed of signalling
(upper bounded by the speed of light in vacuum, c). Existing results are represented in black and new
results (obtained in this paper), in blue and red. An arrow R → S means that it is possible to construct
resource S from resource R. When the arrow is crossed, that means that no such construction exists.
Constructibility results. We show that an unbiased coin flipping resource CF can be constructed
from a channel with delay resource, CD (Theorem 3). For comparison, Blum’s protocol [12], constructs
a weaker, biased5 coin flipping resource from a bit commitment resource [20]. We provide an explicit
protocol to construct CF from CD and prove its security. The proof holds even in the presence of
adversaries that are not bounded by quantum physics, but only non-signalling constraints.
Impossibility results. In Theorem 4 we show that constructing a (biased) coin flipping resource is
impossible in the relativistic setting without additional setup assumptions (e.g., the presence of a shared
resource such as CD). This result holds even if the players are only bounded by non-signalling con-
straints,6 or if we restrict the adversary to being computationally bounded or having bounded storage.
Impossibility of bit commitment follows from Blum’s construction [12, 20] of CF from BC (Corollary 6),
and impossibility of constructing a channel with delay CD follows from Theorem 3 (Corollary 5).
Since the literature on relativistic bit commitment also studies the case of extending the time dur-
ing which such a commitment holds, we also look at the task of constructing a channel with a long
delay CDlong from multiple channels (labelled by i) with shorter delays {CDishort}i. We show that this
again is impossible without other setup assumptions than the assumed channels with delays {CDishort}i
(Theorem 7). This impossibility result holds irrespective of whether the protocol is classical, quantum or
non-signalling,6 and also holds if the adversary is computationally bounded.
Consequences of these results. Many quantum protocols have been proposed in the relativistic
setting to circumvent classical impossibility results for BC. To the best of our knowledge, none of these
protocols have been successfully used as subroutines in larger cryptosystems (which is the main motivation
5Originally, Blum’s protocol constructs an unfair coin flip, in which one party can abort after seeing the flip [12]. This
may be transformed into a biased coin flip if the honest party flips a coin locally when the dishonest party aborts [20].
6A non-signalling player can generate non-signalling correlations between their own trusted agents at different locations.
Note however that that if we were to allow two distrusting players (Alice and Bob) to generate non-signalling correlations
between them, this would have to be modeled as an extra setup assumption, namely a shared resource.
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for constructing such primitives), and attempts to do so are insecure [4, Appendix A]. But due to the
lack of composable framework that can model Minkowski space, it has been impossible to prove whether
composable constructions of these resources do exist. Our results show that allowing quantum (and even
non-signalling6) protocols that respect relativistic constraints is not sufficient to construct BC, CF , or
CD without additional assumptions. This implies that none of the proposed relativistic bit commitment
schemes are composable (e.g., [1, 2, 10, 11]). This extends to the non-relativistic setting (e.g., [8]),
since a non-realtivistic protocol corresponds to the special case where all players are in the same position
in space (and thus do not have any constraints on the speed of communication). Our proof also holds
against computationally bounded adversaries, and adversaries with bounded storage, which implies that
results in the bounded storage model are not composable either (e.g., [7]).
The other problem considered in the literature on relativisitic bit commitment is extending the time
of a commitment. Our results show that this cannot be done with a composable definition of timed
commitment (see the definition of CD in Sec. 2.3 and following discussion). Hence the techniques used
in [2, 21] to extend the time of a relativistic bit commitment cannot be used in a composable way. As for
previous results, this holds as well if the adversary is computationally limited or has bounded quantum
memory.
The framework naturally allows positive results to be proven as well—by making extra setup as-
sumptions. This approach was used by Unruh [19], who showed (everlasting) quantum bit commitment
is achievable if we assume signature cards as trusted setup. In this work we construct a CF resource
from a CD, and leave open the problem of finding weaker assumptions that still allow CF or BC to be
constructed.
1.2 Structure of this paper.
In Sec. 2 we introduce the model that we use to prove our results. We explain the Abstract Cryptography
framework in Sec. 2.1. We give an overview of Causal Boxes instantiated with Minkowski space in
Sec. 2.2—a formal presentation of Causal Boxes is given in Appendix A. And in Sec. 2.3 we define the
two party resources CF , CD, and BC. Our results are then presented in Sec. 3 and the proofs are given
in Appendix B. Finally, we conclude in Sec. 4 with a discussion of these results.
2 Framework
2.1 Composable security: the abstract cryptography framework [5]
2.1.1 Resources, converters and distinguishers.
Let us review the basics of the abstract cryptography framework. [5] The following is adapted from [22]
for the case of protocols between two mutually distrusting parties (e.g., bit commitment, coin flipping)
and has been simplified for our purposes. We refer the reader to [5] and [22] for more general definitions
and further examples.
Abstract systems. Abstract cryptography views cryptography as a resource theory: a protocol con-
structs a resource from some other resource, e.g., Blum’s protocol [12] constructs a coin flipping resource
from a bit commitment resource. In this section we introduce the building blocks of the framework—
resources, converters (e.g., protocols) and a notion of distance (distinguishability) between resources—
and in Section 2.2 we explain how these objects are instantiated with Causal Boxes [6].
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Figure 2: Starting from a resource R, converters α, β and γ construct a new resource S = αAβAγBR.
The sequences of arrows at the interfaces between objects represent (arbitrary) rounds of communication.
For simplicity, we may omit the indices, S = αβRγ, so that converters to the left of the resource (α, β)
are implicitly connected to Alice’s interface, and converters on the right (γ) are connected to Bob’s.
A resource R in a two party setting is an (abstract) system with interfaces i ∈ {A,B}, each accessible
to a user i (and their trusted agents) providing them with certain controls. An operation that is performed
by a party at their interface is modeled as a converter : a system α with an outside and an inside interface,
the inner interface connects to an interface i of the resource, and the outer interface becomes the new
interface of the resulting resource. We write αiR to denote the resource resulting from connecting α to
the i interface of R. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Distinguishing resources. The security of a cryptographic system is quantified in terms of distin-
guishability from a corresponding ideal system (Fig. 3). For example, the ideal resource “random bit
generator”, S, would be a black box that generates and outputs a uniformly random bit at a time t which
is independent of everything outside the box. A specific practical implementation R of this functionality
could be a quantum protocol: prepare a qubit in a state 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉), measure it in the Z-basis and
output the measurement result at time t. Treated as black boxes, both resources R and S output a
uniformly random classical bit and cannot be distinguished by an outsider. For more complex resources,
we may ask: distinguishability from whose perspective? Here, the traditional notion of an adversary is
generalized to an arbitrary distinguisher which models not only possible adversarial behaviour but also
the whole environment of a cryptographic protocol. In other words, a distinguisher models information-
processing steps that could take place before, after or during the protocol under consideration.
Definition 1 (Distinguishing advantage [22]). A distinguisher (Figure 3) for two resources R,S is a
system D with two interfaces: an inside interface that connects to all the interfaces of a resource, R
or S, and an outside interface that outputs a single bit: a guess whether it is interacting with R or S.
The advantage of a specific distinguisher D is then given by
dD(R,S) = |Pr [D(R) = 0]− Pr [D(S) = 0]| ,
where D(R) is the output of D when interacting with R.
The distinguishing advantage for a class of distinguishers D is defined as
dD(R,S) = sup
D∈D
dD(R,S).
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric on the space of resources satisfying the identity,
symmetry and triangle inequality properties [22]. If a class of distinguishers D is such that for every
D ∈ D, Dα ∈ D, then the pseudo-metric is non-increasing under application of the converter α, i.e.
dD(αR,αS) ≤ dD(R,S).
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Figure 3: Security in terms of distinguishers. Composable security of a real resource is defined in
terms of the success probability of a class of distinguishers (for example computationally bounded or
unbounded, classical, quantum or non-signalling) in distinguishing the real system from the ideal one. A
distinguisher, modelling all the environment of a resource, is given black-box access to either the real or
the ideal systems and a complete description of the input-output behaviour of both systems and must
guess which one it was interacting with by outputting either a 0 or a 1. The distinguishing advantage
is then given by the statistical distance between the two random bits output when interacting with the
real and ideal systems, respectively.
Classes of distinguishers. Changing the power of the distinguisher (e.g., with some computational or
memory bound, or performing only classical, quantum or non-signalling operations) results in different
metrics and different levels of security. For example, if a protocol provides classical computational security,
this means that the resource constructed may be perfectly indistinguishable from an ideal resource when
considering only computationally bounded distinguishers, but they could be easily distinguished using
computationally unbounded (or quantum) distinguishers. This is addressed in more detail in the following.
2.1.2 Cryptographic security.
We want to address questions such as “does a protocol Π construct the ideal resource S from an initial
resource R?” The resource constructed will essentially depend on which players may be honest. For
example, in the case of coin flipping, if both parties are honest we expect the protocol to construct
a resource that provides each party with a copy of the same uniformly random bit. But if a party is
dishonest, this might be a too strong requirement. Instead, we “only” construct a resource that allows
the dishonest party to either abort if she does not like the value of the generated bit, or to bias the bit
towards either 0 or 1. [20]
In the case of two party protocols, we want to make a statement about three cases: where both
parties are honest, Alice is dishonest, and Bob is dishonest. The resources available to the players are
given by a tuple (R,RA, RB), where R denotes the shared resource when both a honest, RA is available
to an honest Bob and dishonest Alice (presumably, providing more functionalities to Alice than R), and
RB is shared between an honest Alice and dishonest Bob. Likewise, the constructed resources are also
given by such a tuple (S, SA, SB).
A two-player protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB) is essentially a pair of converters that can be connected to the
interfaces of the shared resources (R,RA, RB). When both are honest, the resulting system is given by
ΠARΠB (the “real system”), which should be close to indistinguishable from the ideal resource S.
When Alice is dishonest, the protocol ΠA is removed in the corresponding real system, because we
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do not know what protocol a dishonest player would follow. On the “real” side we now have RAΠB. On
the ideal side, we have SA, but in most cases RAΠB and SA are trivially distinguishable since Alice’s
interface of RAΠB is generally very different from her interface of SA: SA provides an idealized interface,
which, in the case of coin flipping, might allow Alice to abort. In the real system, RAΠB Alice receives
messages from Bob, and could provoke an abort by sending invalid messages or not responding.
To allow for the comparison and define security against dishonest Alice, we require the existence of
a converter (or simulator) σA which when connected to Alice’s interface of SA makes these two systems
close to indistinguishable. Note that connecting this simulator σA only makes Alice weaker, since any
operation performed by the simulator could equivalently be performed by an adversary connected directly
to the interface of the ideal resource. Further, the simulator’s behaviour is independent of the internal
workings of the ideal functionality SA. Security in the case of a dishonest Bob is defined similarly.
Definition 2 (Cryptographic security [22]). A protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB) constructs S = (S, SA, SB) from
R = (R,RA, RB) within a distance , with respect to a set D of distinguishers and a set S 3 ΠA,ΠB
of converters, if the following conditions hold:
dD(ΠARΠB, S) ≤ ε,
∃σA ∈ S, dD(RAΠB, σASA) ≤ ε,
∃σB ∈ S, dD(ΠARA, SBσB) ≤ ε.
We sometimes write R Π−→ S to denote such a constructions. These conditions are illustrated in Fig. 4.
A possibility result for a construction R Π−→ S with parameters (ε,S,D) is a statement of the form:
there exists a protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB) that ε-constructs S from R, i.e.
∃ΠA,ΠB, σA, σB ∈ S, ∀D ∈ D, dD(ΠARΠB, S) ≤ ε, (1)
dD(RAΠB, σASA) ≤ ε, (2)
dD(ΠARA, SBσB) ≤ ε. (3)
We then say that R is stronger than S. An impossibility result with the same parameters has the form:
there exists no protocol Π = (ΠA,ΠB) that ε-constructs S from R,
∀ΠA,ΠB, σA, σB ∈ S, ∃D ∈ D, either condition (1), (2), or (3) does not hold.
The strength of a security proof depends on the range of the class S of simulators and protocols,
the class D of distinguishers used in the security definition, as well as the assumed and constructed
resources R and S. For construction results, a strong statement has the form “we can easily construct S
from R, and we can easily simulate any cheating behaviour, such that even a very powerful distinguisher
could not tell apart our construction from the ideal system.” Therefore, ideally we would want S to be
restricted to converters that are easy to implement physically, and we want the set of distinguishers D
to be as general as possible. For impossibility results, a strong statement has the form “we can always
easily distinguish any system constructed from R from the resource S, even if we allow for very powerful
protocols and simulators.” Therefore, we try to make S to be as general as possible, and we restrict D
to correspond to efficient or otherwise easy to implement distinguishers.7
7In some settings, we may want to give more power to one of the players. This is the case for blind computation results
[23–25], where for example Bob represents a client with limited computational power and Alice a powerful server (which
may for example perform arbitrary quantum operations). In other examples, we may want to restrict honest players to use
efficient protocols, while allowing the simulators of dishonest behaviour to be arbitrary. In these and other cases, we can
adjust the sets for ΠA,ΠB , σA, σB and D to suit the scenario. For the results in this paper, this will not be necessary.
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RS
ΠA ΠB
≈
dD(ΠARΠB, S) ≤ ε
(a) When both parties are honest, the composition of Alice’s and Bob’s protocol with their shared resource must
be ε-indistinguishable from the constructed resource S.
RA
SA
ΠB
σA
≈
∃σA ∈ S, dD(RA ΠB, σA SA) ≤ ε
(b) When Alice is dishonest and Bob is honest, the resulting real system obtained by removing Alice’s honest
protocol must be ε-simulatable by connecting a converter σA (called a simulator) to Alice’s interface of
corresponding ideal system, SA.
RB
SB
ΠA
σB
≈
∃σB ∈ S, dD(ΠARA, SB σB) ≤ ε
(c) When Bob is dishonest and Alice is honest, the resulting real system obtained by removing Bob’s honest
protocol must be ε-simulatable by connecting a converter σB to Bob’s interface of the corresponding ideal
system, SB .
Figure 4: The three conditions from Definition 2.
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We do not specify what S and D should be used in Definition 2, since this will be different for
different theorems. For example, when we prove that no protocol can construct a biased coin flipping
resource in Theorem 4, the proof holds for converters ΠA,ΠB, σA, σB ∈ S that have unbounded memory,
unbounded computational power, and are post-quantum—they are only restricted to be non-signalling.
The distinguisher D that is used to distinguish the real from ideal system runs these converters internally,
and thus has the same computational and memory requirements as these converters.
Remark 1 (Capturing bounded systems). Note that when a statement we want to prove involves an
existence quantifier (over the set of converters S for a possibility result, and over the set of distinguishers
D for an impossibility proof), it is not necessary to define the entire set (S, D), it is sufficient to convince
oneself that the corresponding system does belong in this set. We use this to prove impossibility results
for computationally bounded adversaries as well as in the bounded and noisy storage models in Sec. 3
without defining either the complexity of the systems or the bound on the storage. We achieve this by
finding a distinguisher that can distinguish real from ideal systems, and does so by internally running
instances of these systems. This means that security already breaks down when the rest of the world
(captured by the distinguisher D) has the same memory bounds as the honest players and simulator in
the protocol. Since a model needs the distinguisher to have at least the same power as the players and
simulator for a protocol to be composable with itself, our impossibility results holds for any such model,
regardless of the exact bounds on the computational power or storage, and irrespective of how this is
defined.
2.2 Cryptography in relativistic settings: the Causal Boxes framework [6]
The abstract cryptography framework [5] follows a top-down approach to modelling cryptographic security
starting from the highest level of abstraction and proceeding downwards, introducing at each level only the
minimum necessary specifications. The composability of abstract systems in the abstract cryptography
framework makes it possible to provide a general, composable security definition, which is independent
from the models of communication or computation. It can then be instantiated with whatever model is
needed—here, Causal Boxes to model relativistic cryptography. In this section we give a brief, informal
overview of the Causal Boxes framework. A formal introduction may be found in Appendix A.
Causal boxes [6] are a model of information-processing systems which may interact with each other
in arbitrary ways, so long as they respect causality (Fig. 5a). In broad lines, a causal box Φˆ is a system
with input and output wires which may carry quantum or classical information. A concrete example is a
physical box containing some optical elements (like beam-splitters) and connected to optical fiber cables:
each wire may carry several messages at different times (or even in a superposition of different times). A
single instance of a message is modelled as a quantum state in the joint Hilbert space H⊗ l2(T ), where
H is the Hilbert space of the actual classical/quantum message, T is a partially ordered set that defines
an ordering on the space of messages and l2(T ) is the sequence space with bounded 2-norm.8 In the
simple cases where a quantum state ρ ∈ H is sent at a well-defined space-time coordinate P ∈ T , T
can be taken to be Minkowski space-time and we can simply represent the total state as a pair (ρ, P ).
In this paper we only need to consider such cases.
Causality condition. Causality requires that outputs produced at space-time point P ∈ T can depend
only on inputs produced in its causal past, P ′ ≺ P (at this stage, T could be any set of points equipped
8This is the state space of a single input/output message. More generally, wires which can carry messages in a
superposition of different numbers and time orderings can be represented by the symmetric Fock space of this message
space [6]. The symmetry comes from the fact that there is no special ordering of the messages other than the space-time
ordering, which is already given in the state description itself. See Appendix A for further details.
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(ρ, P )
classical/quantum message space-time stamp
Λˆ
Ωˆ
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(b)
Figure 5: a. Causal boxes are information-processing systems that respect causality and are closed
under composition (serial, parallel or loops). Arbitrary composition of the causal boxes Φˆ, Ψˆ and Λˆ is
a causal box Ωˆ. b. Minkowski space-time. The causal diamond of the space-time points A and B
(shaded in gray) with A ≺ B is denoted by D(A,B). In this figure, point C ∈ D(A,B), and point D
is space-like separated from A since the future light cone of neither of the points completely contains
the future light cone of the other.
with any partial order to represent causality). In general, a causal box is a map from the space of the
inputs to the space of the outputs that respects this notion of causality.9 Composition of causal boxes
may be done in series, in parallel or through (feedback) loops (Fig. 5a), and arbitrary composition of
causal boxes results in a causal box. A more technical and detailed description of the framework can be
found in Appendix A.
Minkowski space-time. In this paper we apply the formalism of Causal Boxes to Minkowski space-time
T , where each coordinate corresponds to a vector P = (x, t) with three dimensions of space and one
of time. In special relativity, T has a natural partial order, “P1 = (x1, t1) ≺ P2 = (x2, t2) if light can
reach x2 from x1 in time t2− t1, that is if ‖x2−x1‖ ≤ c(t2− t1), where c is the speed of light.” In this
case we say that space-time point P1 is in the causal past of P2. If two points are not ordered, we say
that they are space-like separated. The causal diamond of a pair of space-time points, P1 ≺ P2, denoted
by D(P1, P2) is the intersection of the future light cone of P1 with the past light cone of P2. This
represents the maximal space-time region that can be affected by events at P1 and also affect events at
P2 (Fig. 5b). In the following, we assume that all players involved in a relativistic cryptographic protocol
initially agree upon a coordinate system to represent all space-time points.
Remark 2 (Range of causal boxes). Causal Boxes can model not only quantum processes, but also
non-signalling systems with quantum and classical inputs (for example, PR-boxes are causal boxes) [6].
This will be useful in security proofs, for example to cover very powerful adversaries, so let us denote
by C the set of all allowed causal boxes in T , and by DC ⊂ C the subset of systems that are valid
distinguishers.
When proving the possibility result in Section 3.1 (Theorem 3), we show that
∃Π, σ ∈ S, ∀D ∈ DC, dD(ΠR,S σ) ≤ ε,
9Technically, this implies that there must necessarily be a finite time gap between an input to a causal box and an
output that depends on this input modelling the fact that any causal information processing task takes a strictly non-zero
amount of time.
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where S are just efficient classical systems. This means that even distinguishers bounded only by non-
signalling constraints cannot distinguisher the real from ideal systems, and the construction still holds
in the presence of such unrestricted adversaries.
When proving impossibility results in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we show that
∀Π, σ ∈ S, ∃D ∈ DS, dD(ΠR,S σ) > ε,
where S ⊂ C is any set of systems (e.g., classical, computationally limited or with bounded memory)
and DS is a set of distinguishers with similar requirements. This means firstly that our impossibility
results hold even if we consider protocols that are bounded only by non-signalling constraints (the case
were S = C). And secondly, if we consider a setting where adversaries are limited, then the results carry
over to this setting. For example, our impossibility proofs also hold in the bounded storage model (where
S and DS have bounded memory) or a computational setting (where S and DS are computationally
limited). See also Remark 1 in Sec. 2.1.
2.3 Two-party resources
We may now define the resources needed to model and prove our results. In this section, we model
these resources by defining their output values and space-time positions given input values and space-
time positions. As in illustration of how this is a special case of the more complete Causal Box model
instantiated with Mikowski space, we provide in Appendix A.5 a formal definition of a CD as a causal
box.
2.3.1 Coin flipping (CF)
A coin flip resource provides two distrustful players with a random coin flip—if they both behave honestly.
If one of them is dishonest, then the literature defines different resources that could be constructed. The
most common, e.g., [12], is to allow the coin flip to be unfair : a dishonest player who does not like the
outcome can abort before the honest player gets to see this outcome. In [20], the authors define a biased
coin flip, where instead of aborting, a dishonest party can bias the outcome. In this section we follow
[20] and define a p-biased coin flip CFp. We define an unfair coin flip CFuf in Appendix C.1, where we
prove that CF1/2 can be constructed from CFuf.
Definition 3 (Coin flipping, CFp). A p-biased coin flip, CFp = {CF,CF pA, CF pB}, is defined as follows.
CF : Alice receives a uniformly random bit c at
location P , and Bob receives the same bit
at location P ′.
CF pB: Dishonest bob receives his coin flip output
c in advance at location P1 and at location
P2  P1 he may input a bit b (which may
depend on the value of c). Alice receives a
bit cAo at location P  P2: with probability
p she receives cAo = b, else cAo = c. Causality
requirement: P1 ≺ P2 ≺ P .
CF pA: analogous to CF
p
B, with the roles reversed.
CF
(c, P ) (c, P ′)
Alice Bob
CF pB
(co ∈ {c, b}, P )
(c, P1)
(b ∈ {0, 1}, P2)
P1 ≺ P2 ≺ P
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Note that by definition of CF , it should be clear that the uniformly random bit, c is generated
independently by the resource CF and cannot be correlated with anything outside it. This is because
the honest resource CF takes no inputs that could possibly influence this output. Further, a bias of 0
means that the coin flip is uniform, a bias of 1 means that the dishonest player has complete control over
the outcome, and a bias of p means that any outcome can occur with probability at most 1/2 + p/2.
2.3.2 Bit commitment (BC)
As mentioned in the introduction, bit commitment is an important cryptographic primitive and its security
relates to its hiding and binding properties which were also introduced in Section 1. Here, we formally
define what an ideal bit commitment resource behaves like in Minkowski space-time.
Definition 4 (Bit commitment, BC). A bit commitment resource tuple BC := {BC,BCA, BCB} is
defined by the single resource BC (with BCA and BCB identical to BC), which behaves as follows.
1. Alice selects a classical bit a ∈ {0, 1} to
commit to and inputs it at her interface of
BC at a time of her choice t1.
2. Bob receives the message ‘comm’ at time
t′1 > t1 at his interface, indicating that Alice
has committed to a bit.
3. Alice then inputs the command ‘open’ at her
interface at a time of her choice t2.
4. Her original commitment ‘a’ is then revealed
to Bob at time t′2 > t2.
BC
(a, t1)
(open, t2)
(comm, t′1)
(a, t′2)Alice Bob
For simplicity, we only mention the times at which the messages are input and output in Definition 4.
This should naturally also include the location in space of the players.
2.3.3 Channel with delay (CD)
In special relativity, unless two agents meet at the exact same space-time location to exchange messages,
there is necessarily a finite communication delay between them. A channel with delay is a cryptographic
primitive between two parties based on this physical intuition: Alice sends a message and Bob receives
it unaltered with some delay.
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Definition 5 (Channel with delay). A channel with delay CD = (CD,CDA, CDB) between a sender
Alice and a receiver Bob is a tuple of resources characterized by four space-time locations, P ≺ P ′ ≺
Q′ ≺ Q, and defined as follows.
CD: Honest Alice inputs a quantum state a
into the channel at location P , i.e., the in-
put message is (a, P ). Honest Bob receives
(a,Q) at location Q.
CDA: Dishonest Alice inputs (a, P ′). Honest
Bob receives (a,Q).
CDB: Honest Alice inputs (a, P ). Dishonest Bob
receives (a,Q′).
The trusted region of the channel is defined as the
causal diamond of P ′ andQ′: the setD(P ′, Q′) :=
{T : P ′ ≺ T ≺ Q′}.
t
x P
Q
ALICE
BOB
P ′
Q′
trusted region
That is, the CD acts as an identity channel on the message, and as a shift on the space-time stamp.
Furthermore, it allows dishonest players to send (respectively, recieve) the message after (respectively,
before) the honest player. A formal definition of the causal box that implements the CD can be found
in Appendix A.5. The trusted region of the CD is the region where both players can be sure that the
information in the channel remains secure, even when the other is dishonest; as we will see, it is the
region where the CD can be used to construct other resources such as CF (Section 3.1).
Relation to relativistic bit commitment protocols. Typically, in a non-relativistic bit commitment
resource, Alice is free to choose when to open her commitment and also has the choice to not open her
commitment at all. In relativistic protocols, however, the commitment time is usually restricted by the
time taken by light to travel between the remote agents, in which case Alice does not have the freedom
of choosing arbitrary t1 and t2 as in Definition 4: once t1 is fixed, the commitment must be opened at
the latest by t1 + ∆t for some ∆t which depends on the protocol. Bob typically does not know whether
Alice is committed before time t1 + ∆t, when by checking if he has a valid commitment or garbage,
he can know whether she ran the honest protocol at t1 or not, and retroactively decide if she has been
committed to her bit. Furthermore, in some relativistic protocols, e.g., [1], Alice cannot choose to not
open: if she honestly committed at time t1, then after ∆t, the commitment is always opened. The CD
resource from Definition 5 captures exactly this, and hence we analyze the (im)possibility of extending
the delay of such a channel in this work.
Other protocols, e.g., [2], additionally offer the possibility to Alice of aborting before Bob receives
the bit to which she committed. We thus define a variation of Definition 5 in Appendix C.2, where after
inputting her message into the channel, Alice may still change her mind and abort before Bob receives it.
We prove in Appendix C.2 that our main results presented in Sec. 3 still go through with this alternative
definition of a channel with delay.
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3 Results
3.1 Constructing CF
It was shown in [20] that a 1/2-biased coin flipping resource can be perfectly constructed from a bit
commitment resource (Definition 4), by using Blum’s protocol [12]. Here we show that it is in fact
possible to construct an even stronger resource (an unbiased coin flip) from a channel with delay.
Theorem 3 (Construction CD → CF). Given a classical channel with delay CD, there exists a classical
protocol ΠCD→CF = {ΠA,ΠB} that perfectly constructs an unbiased coin flipping resource CF0.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including
quantum and non-signalling distinguishers, see Remark 2 in Sec. 2.2). The honest protocol as well as
the simulator require only elementary local operations and classical communication.
The protocol is described in Definition 6, and the security proof is given in Appendix B.1.
Definition 6 (Protocol ΠCD→CF ). Given a channel with delay CD = (CD,CDA, CDB) characterized
by locations A ≺ A′ ≺ B′ ≺ B (see Definition 5), we define the following honest protocol ΠCD→CF =
(ΠA,ΠB).
1. Alice picks a uniformly random bit, a and sends it through CD from her space-time location A.
Bob receives this bit from CD at his location B.
2. Bob meets Alice at P in the trusted region, i.e., the causal diamond D(A′, B′) to pass on Bob’s
uniformly random bit, b.
3. After receiving b from her agent, Alice computes a⊕ b = c and outputs this value at some point
PAF  P . If Bob did not turn up for the meeting at P , she picks a uniform b herself, and outputs
a⊕ b = c as before.
4. After receiving a from the channel, Bob computes a ⊕ b = c and outputs the result at a point
PBF  B. If Bob does not receiving anything from the channel, he picks a uniform a himself, and
outputs a⊕ b = c as before.
Note that it is important that the point P in the above protocol lies in the trusted region, otherwise
the protocol would not be secure.10 Furthermore, this protocol can be run by a single player on each
side without the need for trusted agents since P lies in the causal future of A and A′ and in the causal
past of B and B′.
In Appendix C.2 we define a weaker channel with delay, namely one which allows Alice to abort and
prevent her message from reaching Bob, CD⊥. We show in the same appendix (Lemma 11), that if the
protocol above is used with CD⊥ instead of CD, then we construct an unfair coin flip CFuf instead of
an unbiased one CF0.
3.2 Impossibility of CF , CD and BC
Impossibility of coin flipping. In the previous section, we showed that an unbiased coin flipping
resource can be constructed from a suitable channel with delay. Here we show that in the absence of
10The existence of the simulators σA and σB used in the proof of Theorem 3 relies crucially on P ∈ D(A′, B′).
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any such shared resource, it is impossible to construct any (biased) coin flip resource solely through the
exchange of messages.
Theorem 4 (Impossibility of CF). It is impossible to construct, with  < 16(1 − p), a p-biased coin
flipping resource between two mutually distrusting parties solely through the exchange of messages
through any relativistic or non-relativistic protocol, be it classical, quantum or non-signalling.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity and
memory requirements as the protocol ΠA,ΠB and simulators σA, σB. In particular, if these are efficient,
classical or have bounded or noisy memory, then so does the distinguisher.
Note that this theorem includes as special case protocols that may send messages in superpositions
of different causal orders. This follows from the fact that the impossibility holds for any causal boxes,
thus in particular for causal boxes that use such superpositions of causal orders.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix B.2. Here below we provide some intuition.
A coin flip CFp does not only guarantee that the output bit is uniform (or biased with probability
p), but also that it is independent of any other bit produced in parallel by some other resource (up to
the bias). This is essential so that a dispute that is resolved with a coin flip would not only be settled
fairly, but also independently from any other dispute. The man in the middle attack mentioned in Sec. 1
would allow dishonest players to perfectly correlate the outcome of two coin flips that are expected to
be independent: if Alice and Bob run a coin flipping protocol, Charlie and Danielle run a second one in
parallel, and Bob and Charlie collude to forward all the communication between Alice and Danielle, Bob
and Charlie could force them to agree on the same coin flip. The proof of Theorem 4 consists in showing
that this is essentially possible for any protocol that does not use any resource other than communication
between the parties involved. A sketch of the main proof idea is provided in Fig. 8 in Appendix B.2. It
generalizes the techniques used in [5] to prove the analogous result for the non-relativistic case.
Impossibility of BC and CD. Combined with Theorem 3 and Blum’s construction [20], Theorem 4
implies impossibility of constructing any channel with delay CD or any commitment BC of no initial
resource is shared by the players.
Corollary 5 (Impossibility of CD). It is impossible to construct CD, with  < 16 , between two mutually
distrusting parties solely through the exchange of messages through any classical, quantum or relativistic
protocol.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity and
memory requirements as the distinguisher used in Theorem 4 composed with the protocol ΠA,ΠB used
in Theorem 3. In particular, if these are efficient, classical and have bounded or noisy memory, then so
does the distinguisher.
Proof. Follows directly from the impossibility of CF in Theorem 4 together with the construction of
unbiased CF from CD (Theorem 3).
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Corollary 6 (Impossibility of BC). It is impossible to construct BC, with  < 112 , between two mutually
distrusting parties solely through the exchange of messages through any classical, quantum or relativistic
protocol. This rules out both arbitrarily long and timed commitments.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity and
memory requirements as the distinguisher used in Theorem 4 composed with the protocol ΠA,ΠB used
in Blum’s protocol [20]. In particular, if these are efficient, classical and have bounded or noisy memory,
then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. Follows directly from the impossibility of CF in Theorem 4 together with the construction of
1
2 -biased CF from BC using Blum’s protocol [20].
Using the same techniques, we show in Appendix C.2 that an abort channel cannot be constructed
either.
3.3 Impossibility of Extending Delays
We show that it is not possible to use several channels with delay to construct a better channel with delay:
the trusted region of the constructed channel will be smaller than the trusted region of at least one of the
individual channels used. In fact, the result is even stronger: the trusted region of the constructed channel
is contained inside the trusted region of at least one of the assumed channels used in the construction.
This means the maximal space-time region within which the information in the channel is guaranteed to
be secure from both dishonest parties cannot be increased even with n copies of a channel. If we view
such a channel with delay as a relativistic bit commitment (Alice inputs a bit into the channel and is
then committed to it, but the commitment is only opened when the bit arrives with a delay at Bob),
this implies that it is not possible to increase the time within which the commitment is both hiding and
binding even if n timed commitment resources are given.
Theorem 7 (Impossibility of extending CD). Given n channels with delay CD1,...,CDn between two
parties, it is impossible to construct with  ≤ 18 a channel CD′ between the two parties with a trusted
region that is larger than the trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols ΠA,ΠB in C, which includes inefficient and non-signalling systems. The
distinguisher needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as
the protocol ΠA,ΠB. In particular, if it is efficient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore,
if the channels constructed and used are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantum
memory requirements as the protocol ΠA,ΠB.
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix B.3. Note that this proof includes as special case
protocols and distinguishers that may send messages in a superposition of going through one channel
CDi or another CDj , or in which a channel may be in a superposition of being used and not used. This
follows from the fact that the impossibility holds for any causal boxes, thus in particular for causal boxes
that use such superpositions of causal orders.
One may consider variations of this result in which slightly different resources are used or constructed.
For example, one could wonder whether having channels with delay going from Bob to Alice may help.
It is however easy to verify from that proof, that these have no impact on the impossibility. Another
variation worth considering is if the channels are abort channels, as defined in Appendix C.2. We prove
in the same appendix that one cannot extend the delay of abort channels either.
17
4 Discussion
The general framework for modelling composable security of relativistic quantum protocols developed here
naturally lends itself to the study of novel possibility and impossibility results in relativistic cryptography
and could provide key insights into classifying possible and impossible information-processing tasks.
Composability issues raised previously. Composability issues with Kent’s 2012 protocol [1] have been
briefly discussed in [11]. A definition which is labeled “composable” is proposed in [11, Appendix B], but
it is not derived using any composable framework. In fact, it is argued in [11] that bit commitment in
the bounded and noisy storage models could satisfy this definition. Since our results carry over to these
settings as well, it follows that either the proposed definition is not composable or it cannot be satisfied.
Note that the impossibility of BC in the bounded storage model is already hinted at in [18], where the
author points out that the model he developed for concurrent composition does not guarantee that a
protocol is secure when run in parallel with another instance of itself.
Superpositions of causal orders. A unique feature of the the causal boxes formalism [6], is that it
can model superpositions of messages exchanged in a superposition of orders in (space-)time (e.g. the
quantum switch [26]) by assigning different space-time stamps (or superpositions thereof) to different
messages. Combining this with the abstract cryptography framework [5], as done in this paper, allows
us to model security in settins where such superpositions are actively used. For example, this allows us
to consider protocols where a message is in a superposition of being sent from Alice to Bob and from
Alice to Charlie, i.e., where Bob and Charlie are in a superposition of having received no message and
one message from Alice. Even for protocols that do not use such structures, possibility results consider
distinguishers that have this capability. And impossibility results show that even such such superpositions
of causal orders, the desired resource cannot be constructed. This is the case for all our results presented
in this work.
A known example of a process involving a superposition of temporal orders of operations is the
quantum switch [26]. It was physically realized in [27, 28], and can be represented in the Causal Box
framework as shown in [6]. Further, the quantum switch was shown to have an operational advantage
over fixed ordering of (or classical mixtures thereof) operations in solving certain computational tasks
[29, 30]. By modelling cryptographic protocols involving such superpositions of orders, one can study
the operational advantage provided by quantum ordering of messages/operations over classical orderings.
Such an approach to studying causal structures in terms of their operational advantages would be useful
for characterising the properties of physically implementable causal structures. This is still an important
open question since there exist more general frameworks for modelling causal structures, such as the
process matrix framework [31] which predict causal structures that are logically possible and yet, have
no known physical implementation.
Error tolerance. Realistic protocols, like those implemented with quantum preparations and measure-
ments, always come with a small probability of error (for example, in Kent’s protocol as in QKD schemes,
this depends on the number of quantum states exchanged between the parties). The ideal resources we
prove cannot be constructed are, by definition, not subject to any errors. But it follows directly from the
composable framework used that impossibility to construct perfect resources (with some error ε) implies
impossibility to construct noisy versions of the resources. To see this, consider a resource CDε that is
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ε-close to CD according to the distinguishing advantage. By the triangle inequality, if a real protocol im-
plements a resource that is ∆-distinguishable from the ideal CD, it will be at least (∆−ε)-distinguishable
from CDε. For example, for an unbiased CF , we have ∆ = 16 , so it is still impossible to perfectly build
any CF that has an error tolerance smaller than that.
Minimal resources for constructions. Our results show that existing bit commitment protocols [1, 2]
cannot construct the target resource BC from an assumption of a shared resource. Nevertheless, we may
still look for initial resources R that allow BC to be constructed. It would be interesting to explore the
minimal resources necessary to achieve this. For example, an assumption (or assurance) that dishonest
players cannot interact with third parties is a good candidate for such an initial resource R. It remains
open to formalize such a resource R within the framework and prove that it is sufficient to construct BC.
Alternative space-time. We have proved our results taking the background physical theory to be
special relativity (in the sense of Minkowski space-time with a finite speed of signalling). The results
would still hold even for other space-time geometries with a fixed background causal structure i.e., for
different choices of the partially ordered set T . However, if we consider a general relativistic framework
(one where the causal order is not fixed until one solves for the metric by considering the mass distribution)
that is compatible with quantum mechanics, there could arise situations where the background causal
structure itself is subject to quantum uncertainty and is no longer fixed.11 Such causal structures can
no longer be explained by a single partially ordered set T and cannot be modelled within the Causal
Boxes framework. In fact, there is currently no framework that can model this and has the properties
required to define cryptographic security.12 Thus it remains open to define a quantum, general relativistic
framework for composable cryptography, and study the problem of constructing bit commitment using
it.
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Appendix
A The causal box framework
The causal box [6] formalism models information-processing systems that are closed under composition
even when the order of operations indefinite (such as a superposition of orders) or dynamically determined
during a protocol’s runtime. Similar formalisms (e.g., [34], [35] and [36]) have been previously developed
but they are only suitable for modelling systems where the order of messages is predefined, they fail
to be closed under composition when considering simple cryptographic protocols that involve dynamical
ordering of messages during runtime [6]. In particular, the formalism allows us to model quantum causal
systems in Minkowski space and construct new causal systems by composing them. This makes it suitable
for modelling composable security of relativistic quantum protocols as done in this paper. We now review
the formal definitions of the objects of the causal box framework [6].
A.1 Message space and wires
1. Space of ordered messages: Every message is modelled as a pair, (v, t) where v ∈ V denotes
the (classical/quantum) message and t ∈ T provides ordering information, where T is a countable,
partially ordered set. The space of a single message is thus a Hilbert space with the orthonormal
basis {|v, t〉}v∈V,t∈T . For a finite V and infinite T , this Hilbert space corresponds to C|V|⊗ l2(T )
where l2(T ) is the sequence space with a bounded 2-norm. Thus |t〉 can be seen as a sequence
which consists of a 1 in position t ∈ T and 0 everywhere else.
2. Wires: The inputs and outputs to a causal box are sent/received through wires which can carry any
number (or a superposition of different numbers) of messages of a fixed dimension, which defines
the dimension of the wire13. Thus the state space of a wire is defined to be a symmetric Fock
space. It is modelled as a Fock space to allow for superpositions of different numbers of messages
and it is a symmetric Fock space since all ordering information associated with the arriving qudits
is already contained in the label t ∈ T and given this label, there is no other ordering on the qudits.
For the Hilbert space, H = Cd ⊗ l2(T ), the corresponding bosonic Fock space is given as
F(Cd ⊗ l2(T )) :=
∞⊕
n=0
∨n(Cd ⊗ l2(T )), (4)
where ∨nH denotes the symmetric subspace of H⊗n and H⊗0 is the one-dimensional space con-
taining the vacuum state |Ω〉.
For example, the state space corresponding to a wire A carrying dA dimensional messages is denoted
by FTA = F(CdA ⊗ l2(T )). The joint space of two wires can be written as FTA ⊗FTB = FTAB and it can
be shown [6] that for any two Hilbert spaces HA = CdA ⊗ l2(T ) and HB = CdB ⊗ l2(T ),
F(HA)⊗F(HB) ∼= F(HA ⊕HB), (5)
Isomorphism 5 tells us that each valid state in the combined state space of two wires, one carrying
dA dimensional messages and the other carrying dB dimensional messages, can be mapped to a valid
13For example a 2 dimensional wire can carry any number of qubits, or can be in a superposition of carrying 2 and 3
qubits but cannot carry qutrits.
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state in the state space of a single wire carrying dA + dB dimensional messages. Hence FTAB, can be
interpreted as the state space of a wire carrying (dA + dB) dimensional messages14.
We now proceed to formally review the definition of causality that causal boxes satisfy, we first define
the notion of cuts on a partially ordered set T which forms an important part of the definition.
A.2 Cuts and causality
Definition 7 (Cuts [6]). A cut of a partially ordered set T is any subset C ⊆ T such that C = ⋃
t∈C
T ≤t,
where T ≤ t = {p ∈ T : p ≤ t}. A cut C is bounded if there exists a point t ∈ T such that C ⊆ T ≤t.
The set of all cuts of T is denoted as C(T ) and the set of all bounded cuts as C(T ).
In this paper, we have taken the partially order set T to be Minkowski space-time, this allows us to
restrict to bounded cuts. This is because every cut in Minkowski space-time is a bounded cuts: any two
space-time points (even those that are unordered i.e., space-like separated) necessarily share a common
causal future. Note that this is not true for a general partially ordered set T .
Definition 8 (Causality function [6]). A function χ : C(T )→ C(T ) is a causality function if it satisfies
the following conditions:
∀C,D ∈ C(T ), χ(C ∪ D) = χ(C) ∪ χ(D), (6a)
∀C,D ∈ C(T ), C ⊆ D ⇒ χ(C) ⊆ χ(D), (6b)
∀C ∈ C(T )\{∅}, χ(C) ⊂ C, (6c)
∀C ∈ C(T ),∀t ∈ C,∃n ∈ N, t /∈ χn(C), (6d)
where χn denotes n compositions of χ with itself, χn = χ ◦ · · · ◦ χ.
Conditions 6a and 6b follow from the considerations that: If the output on C and D can be computed
from χ(C) and χ(D) respectively, the output on C ∪ D can be computed from χ(C) ∪ χ(D), if χ(C)
is needed to compute the output on C, then certainly it is needed to compute the output on D ⊇ C.
Condition 6c is essentially the causal condition that requires that outputs of a causal box can depend
only on inputs produced in its causal past and Condition 6d is to ensure that a causal box does not
produce an infinite number of messages in a finite interval of time (See [6] for details). Definition 8 is
the general definition of the causality function and it simplifies for special choices of the set T [6]. We
are now in a position to review the formal definition of a causal box.
14Conversely, any wire A of messages of dimension dA can be split in two sub-wires A1 and A2 of messages of dimensions
dA1 + dA2 = dA: FTA ∼= FTA1 ⊗ FTA2 . Further, for any subset P ⊆ T , FTA ∼= FPA ⊗ F P˜A , where P˜ = T \P and
FPA = CdA ⊗ l2(P).
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A.3 General definition of a causal box
Definition 9 (Causal box [6]). A (dX , dY )-causal box Φ is a system with input wire X and output
wire Y of dimension dX and dY a, defined by a setb of mutually consistent (Equation (8)), completely
positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) maps (Equation (7))
Φ = {ΦC : T(Fχ(C)X )→ T(FCY )}C∈C(T ) (7)
These maps much be such that for all C,D ∈ C(T ) with C ⊆ D,
trD\C ◦ ΦD = ΦC ◦ trT \χ(C), (8)
where T(F) denotes the set of all trace class operators on the space F and the causality function
χ(.) satisfies all the conditions of Definition 8. FC is the subspace of FT that contains only messages
in positions t ∈ C ⊆ T and trD\C traces out the messages occurring at positions in D\C.
aIt is enough to define a causal box as a map from one input wire to one output wire since a single wire of dimension
d can always be decomposed into n wires of dimensions d1, ..., dn with d = d1 + d2 + ... + dn using the isomorphism of
Equation( 5)
bIn general, it is modelled as a set of maps and not a single map because this allows systems to be included which
produce an unbounded number of messages and are thus not well-defined as a single map on the entire set T , but only on
subsets of T that are upper bounded by a set of unordered points. For example [6].
Equation (8) can be seen as the combination of the two requirements ΦC = trD\C ◦ ΦD and ΦC =
ΦC ◦ trT \χ(C). The first one embodies the mutual consistency requirement while the second, that of
causality.
Remark 8. Note that Definition 9 only considers trace-preserving causal boxes. The definition can be
easily generalised to non-trace preserving causal boxes or sub-normalised causal boxes to account for
post-selection. This is done in [6] by defining a suitable projector on the space of normalised causal
boxes.
Further, just like CPTP maps on quantum states, causal boxes also admit Choi-Jamiołkowski and
Stinespring representations, and in addition, they also admit sequence representations that describe their
sequential action over subsequent, disjoint sets of T . We refer the reader to the original paper [6] for
details regarding these as they are not of particular relevance to the results of this paper.
A.4 Composition of causal boxes
Having defined causal boxes, we are in a position to see how they can be composed. Due to Isomorphism 5,
an input/output wire to a causal box of dimension d can be split into sub-wires of dimensions d1, d2, ..., dn
such that d1 +d2 + ...+dn = d and similarly, wires can also be combined to form a wire with dimensions
equal to the sum of the dimensions of the individual wires. Taking Ports(Φ) to represent a particular
partition of the input and output wires of a causal box Φ into sub-wires, arbitrary composition of causal
boxes can be achieved by combining the following two steps:
1. Parallel composition: Two causal boxes Φ and Ψ can be composed in parallel to obtain a new
causal box Γ = Φ ‖ Ψ whose input and output ports are given by the union of the input and
output ports of Φ and Ψ respectively.
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PCD|AB
A D
B C
C↪→B−−−→ PCD|AB
A D
B C
Figure 6: Classical example for loop composition: A system with classical inputs A, B and
classical outputs C, D can be described by the probability distribution PCD|AB. The new sys-
tem obtained by adding a loop from the output C to input B is then described by the distribution
QD|A =
∑
c
PCD|AB(cd|ac) and is a valid probability distribution as long as the system obeys causality
[6].
2. Loops: Selected output ports of the causal box Γ can be connected with input ports of the same
dimension to form loops.
A classical example of composition through loops can be found in Figure 6. The formal definitions of
parallel composition and loop composition of causal boxes, which generalise thisintuition to the quantum
case can be found in the original paper, [6] where it is also shown that causal boxes are closed under
these arbitrary composition operations.
A.5 The channel with delay as a causal box
The channel with delay was defined in Section 2.3.3. In this section, we show how to model the channel
with delay using the causal box formalism, i.e, by defining it in terms of a set of mutually consistent maps
{ΦC}. Recall that a channel with delay is defined by the tuple of resources CD := {CD,CDA, CDB},
each of the resources CD,CDA and CDB can be equivalently described by the causal boxes ΦCD,ΦCDA
and ΦCDB . In the following, we consider the channel with delay resource characterised by the 4 space-
time points A ≺ A′ ≺ B′ ≺ B.
Definition 10 (Causal box ΦCD description of the channel with delay resource CD). ∀ bounded cuts
C 3 B ⊆ T in Minkowski space T , the causal box ΦCD = {ΦCCD : T(Fχ(C)X ) → T(FCY )}C∈C(T ) is
defined by the maps ΦCCD := IA→B ◦ trχ(C)\A, with IA→B = IV ⊗
[
|B〉〈A|+ |A〉〈B|
]
l2(T )
. X and Y
label the input and output wires to the causal box, IV denotes the identity operation on the Hilbert
space V of the quantum message, l2(T ) is the sequence space (with bounded 2-norm) of the space-time
stamps and χ(C) is any causality function that satisfies the conditions of Definition 8 and the condition
that B ∈ C ⇒ A ∈ χ(C).
Similarly, the resources CDA and CDB can be defined by replacing A with A′ and B with B′ in
Definition 10 respectively. Note that for any subset P ⊆ T , FT ∼= FP⊗F P˜ , where P˜ = T \P. Further,
a natural embedding of FP in FT can be obtained [6] by appending the vacuum state15 to FP
FP ∼= FT ⊗ |Ω〉P˜ ⊆ FT
This allows us to equivalently view the trace trD\C for any two cuts C ⊆ D, as the operation of tracing
out all the messages in space-time locations that belong to the cut D, but not to the cut C and replacing
15|Ω〉P˜ represents the one dimensional subspace of F P˜ that contains the vacuum state.
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all of them by the vacuum state |Ω〉. With this, we can see that in Definition 10, trχ(C)\A(ρ) for an
arbitrary input state ρ ∈ T(Fχ(C)X ) will always result in a state of the form σ ⊗ |A〉〈A| ⊗ |Ω〉〈Ω|A˜ where
σ ∈ F(V), which without loss of generality, we denote by σ ⊗ |A〉〈A| where it is understood that there
is “nothing" i.e., the vacuum state |Ω〉 at all other space-time locations A˜ ∈ T .
It is easy to verify that ΦCD is indeed a causal box i.e., that it satisfies Equation 8. The left hand
side of the equation gives, for an arbitrary input state ρ ∈ T(Fχ(C)X ) and any cut D 3 B ⊇ C
ΦCCD(ρ) = trD\C ◦ ΦDCD(ρ) = trD\C ◦ IA→B ◦ trχ(D)\A(ρ)
=
{
trD\C(σ ⊗ |B〉〈B|), A ∈ χ(D)
|Ω〉〈Ω|T , otherwise
=
{
σ ⊗ |B〉〈B|, B ∈ C
|Ω〉〈Ω|T , otherwise
(9)
Similarly, the right hand side of Equation 8 becomes
ΦCCD(ρ) = ΦCCD ◦ trC\χ(C)(ρ) = IA→B ◦ trχ(C)\A ◦ trC\χ(C)(ρ)
=
{
σ ⊗ |B〉〈B|, A ∈ χ(C)
|Ω〉〈Ω|T , otherwise
(10)
Since we have16 B ∈ C ⇔ A ∈ χ(C) by Definition 10, and Equations 9 and 10 hold for arbitrary
input state ρ, the expressions in Equations 9 and 10 are equal giving trD\C ◦ ΦDCD = ΦCCD ◦ trC\χ(C) as
required by Definition 9 of a causal box. This shows that ΦCD of Definition 10 (and similarly ΦCDA and
ΦCDB ) is indeed a causal box.
Remark 9. Note that Definition 10 and the fact that ΦCD is a causal box imply that ΦCD cannot
produce any (non-vacuum) output on cuts that do not contain the point B. This is due to the fact
that in Minkowski space, for any cut C with B /∈ C, we can find a cut D ⊃ C containing B. The mutual
consistency condition (Equation 8) would then demand that no non-vacuum outputs are produced in
the cut C as the only non-vacuum output in D will be produced at B /∈ C. Thus it is enough to define
ΦCD only on cuts that include B as done in Definition 10.
B Proofs of all results
B.1 Constructing CF
Theorem 3 (Construction CD → CF). Given a classical channel with delay CD, there exists a classical
protocol ΠCD→CF = {ΠA,ΠB} that perfectly constructs an unbiased coin flipping resource CF0.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including
quantum and non-signalling distinguishers, see Remark 2 in Sec. 2.2). The honest protocol as well as
the simulator require only elementary local operations and classical communication.
16Note that the implication B ∈ C ⇒ A ∈ χ(C) follows from the definition of the causality function while the implication
A ∈ χ(C) ⇒ B ∈ C follows from the fact that for any χ(C) 3 A, the causal box ΦCD when acting on an arbitrary input
state ρ, always produces an output on a cut containing B (by definition).
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Proof. The protocol ΠCD→CF (Definition 6) constructs CF0 from CD iff all three conditions of Fig. 7
are satisfied. The condition of Fig. 7a trivially holds. To see that the conditions in Figures 7b and 7c
also hold, consider the following simulators.
σA is defined as follows.
1. Receive the input a at the space-time location A′ at the outer interface. If no a is received, pick
one uniformly at random.
2. On receiving input c at P2 at the inner interface, output b = a⊕ c at the outer interface at P .
For the above construction of σA to work, both P2 and A′ must lie in the causal past of P . Since
P lies in the trusted region, A′ ≺ P necessarily holds. Since there are no constraints on the space-time
points at which CF 0A can produce an output, we can always make it output at a point P2 ≺ P .
σB is defined as follows.
1. Receive the input b at the space-time location P at the outer interface. If no b is received, pick
one uniformly at random.
2. On receiving input c at P1 at the inner interface, output a = b⊕ c at the outer interface at B′.
For the above construction of σB to work, both P1 and P must lie in the causal past of B′. Again,
P being in the trusted region ensures that P ≺ B′ necessarily holds and P1 ≺ B′ holds since there are
no restrictions on the space-time points at which CFB can produce an output.
It is easy to see that for the above mentioned constructions of the simulators σA and σB, the real
and ideal systems of Figures 7a-7c are perfectly indistinguishable (for any distinguisher D) since a, b
and c always satisfy the condition that any two of them sum bit-wise to the third. Further, Alice can
learn the value of both bits a and b before Bob does but she cannot bias the value of Bob’s output,
a⊕ b in any way. Neither can she prompt Bob to abort the protocol after learning the value of her bit
a, because she has to send a into the channel before he receives b at the point P (by the non empty
trusted region condition). Hence the protocol perfectly constructs an unbiased coin flipping resource
CF0 from a channel with delay CD.
B.2 Impossibility of CF
Theorem 4 (Impossibility of CF). It is impossible to construct, with  < 16(1 − p), a p-biased coin
flipping resource between two mutually distrusting parties solely through the exchange of messages
through any relativistic or non-relativistic protocol, be it classical, quantum or non-signalling.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity and
memory requirements as the protocol ΠA,ΠB and simulators σA, σB. In particular, if these are efficient,
classical or have bounded or noisy memory, then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. For the construction to be valid, all conditions of Fig. 8 must hold. As explained in the figure
caption, the first step is to combine the three conditions and use the triangle inequality to obtain Fig. 8d.
Next we will show that for any causal order of the messages c, c′, b and b′ in Fig. 8d, the best possible
classical, quantum or non-signalling strategy of σ leads to a distinguishing advantage of at least 12(1−p)
between CF pBσCF
p
A and CF . We present here only the optimal strategy—it is a straight-forward if
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CD
CF
(a, B)(a, A)
(b, P )
(a⊕ b, PAF ) (a⊕ b, PBF ) (c, PAF ) (c, PBF )
ΠA ΠB
≈0
PAF  P , PBF  B
(a) Honest Alice and Bob: ΠACDΠB ≈0 CF
CDA
CF 0A
b =
a⊕ c
(a, B)(a, A′)
(b, P )
(a⊕ b, PBF )
(a, A′)
(b, P )
(c, P2) (c, PBF )
ΠB
σA
≈0
P2 ≺ P , A′ ≺ P
(b) Dishonest Alice: ∃σA such that CDAΠB ≈0 σA CF 0A.
CDB
CF 0B
a =
b⊕ c
(a, B′)(a, A)
(b, P )
(a⊕ b, PAF )
(a, B′)
(b, P )
(c, PAF ) (c, P1)
ΠA
σB
≈0
P1 ≺ B′, P ≺ B′
(c) Dishonest Bob: ∃σB such that ΠACDB ≈0 CF 0B σB.
Figure 7: Conditions for constructibility of a fair and unbiased coin flip CF0 from a channel with delay
CD. Since the coin flip has p = 0 the biasing bit that a dishonest party may input has no effect, so we
do not draw it.
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CF
(d, PA) (d, PB) (c, PA) (c, PB)
ΠA ΠB
≈
(a) ΠAΠB ≈ CF
CF pA
(d, PB)
(c′, P3)
(b′, P4)
(cBo , PB)(1) (2)
ΠB
σA
≈
(b) Dishonest Alice: ∃σA : ΠB ≈ σA CF bA
CF pB
(d, PA)
(c, P1)
(b, P2)
(cAo , PA)(1) (2)
ΠA
σB
≈
(c) Dishonest Bob: ∃σB : ΠA ≈ CF bB σB
CF pB CF
p
A CF
(c, PA) (c, PB)(cAo , PA) (cBo , PB)
(c, P1)
(b, P2)
(c′, P3)
(b′, P4)
σAB
≈3
P2 ≺ PA, P4 ≺ PB
(d) ∃σAB : CF bB σAB CF bA ≈3 CF
Figure 8: Impossibility of coin flipping: proof sketch. For a p-biased Coin Flipping to be -
constructible solely through the exchange of messages, conditions (a)-(c) must be satisfied. The
composition (1) of the system on the l.h.s. of (c) (ΠA) with that on the l.h.s. of (b) (ΠB) yields
the system on the l.h.s. of (a) (ΠAΠB) which gives the condition (d) for the corresponding right hand
sides (2) with σAB = σB σA. To prove impossibility, we show in Appendix B.2 that for any causal order
of the messages c, c′, b and b′, the best possible classical, quantum or non-signalling strategy of σ leads
to a distinguishing advantage of at least 3 = 12(1− p) between CF pB σ CF pA and CF in (d). Note that
if the parties had access to a shared resource R, a condition analogous to (d) could not be obtained by
composing (b) and (c), and the same impossibility proof would no longer be applicable.
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C C ′
B B′
Figure 9: The causal ordering of inputs and outputs of simulator σ (see Figure 8d) that provide it the
maximum information about the outputs co and c′o. C, C ′, B and B′ (∈ {0, 1}) represent the random
variables of which the corresponding lower case alphabets are specific instances of. In addition, B and
B′ may causally influence each other, but this does not offer any advantage to σ because the optimal
strategy is where both b and b′ depend on c (or c′).
tedious calculation to verify that all other causal orderings and possible input-output correlations in each
case do not yield a lower distinguishing advantage.
The simulator’s task is to ensure to the best of its capabilities that cAo and cBo are equal. The causal
order of the messages that provide σ with the maximum information to achieve this task is the one
depicted by the directed acyclic graph (DAG)17 in Fig. 9, where σ can learn the values of c and c′ first
and accordingly correlate the values of b and b′ which are then input to CF pA and CF
p
B respectively. In
this case, the best possible strategy that the simulator could adopt would be one where it produces the
input-output correlations b = b′ = c or b = b′ = c′ all the time. The probability that cAo equals cBo for
such a strategy (say, b = b′ = c) is:
P (cAo = cBo ) = P (cAo = cBo |c = c′).P (c = c′) + P (cAo = cBo |c 6= c′).P (c 6= c′)
= 12 +
1
2[P (c
A
o = cBo |c 6= c′, both biased).P (both biased)
+ P (cAo = cBo |c 6= c′,A biased).P (A biased)
+ P (cAo = cBo |c 6= c′,B biased).P (B biased)
+ P (cAo = cBo |c 6= c′, none biased).P (none biased)]
= 12 +
1
2[1.p
2 + 0.p(1− p) + 1.p(1− p) + 0.(1− p)2]
= 12(1 + p)
A distinguisher connected to CF pB σ CF
p
A or CF can access the two outputs produced at the outer
interfaces of these systems. If the distinguisher guesses CF pB σ CF
p
A every time the two outputs differ
in value and CF pB σ CF
p
A or CF with uniform probability every time the two outputs are equal, the
distinguishing advantage would be:
3 ≥ d(CF pB σ CF pA, CF ) ≥ P (cAo 6= cBo ) =
1
2(1− p) (11)
This distinguishing advantage  is equal to zero only when p = 1 (totally biased coin) and thus, for a
non-trivial p, it is not possible to make the distinguishing advantage  arbitrarily small.
17DAGs are widely used in the literature to represent causal structures. For classical causal structures (as is the case
here, given that the inputs and outputs to σ are classical bits), the nodes (circles) represent random variables and the
edges (arrows) represent causal influences.
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The distinguisher used to distinguish the left and right-hand sides in Fig. 8d is quite a trivial system,
that only needs one bit of memory and compare the two output bits. The existence of such a distinguisher
with advantage 3 implies that there exists another distinguisher with advantage ε that can distinguish
the left and right-hand sides from either Fig. 8a, 8b or 8c. We now go through the steps of this
argument more slowly, to determine the exact complexity (both in terms of memory and computation)
of the distinguisher that we have proven to exist. To construct Fig. 8d from the three first conditions
in Fig. 8, we use the following two arguments several times.
The first is the triangle inequality, namely that
R ≈ε S
S ≈ε′ T
}
=⇒ R ≈ε+ε′ T.
Note that this holds for individual distinguishers, hence the contrapositive states that if there exists a
distinguisher that can distinguish R from T with advantage ε+ ε′, then exactly the same distinguisher
can distinguish either R from S with advantage ε or S from T with advantage ε′.
The second generic argument—contractivity—uses the fact that for any resources R,S and any
other system α,
R ≈ε S =⇒ αR ≈ε αS.
Unlike the previous argument, this one involves a change of distinguisher, namely if for some D,
dD(αR,αS) > ε, then dDα(R,S) > ε, where Dα corresponds to the composition of D with α.
We now start with the existence of the trivial distinguisher D for Fig. 8d described above, and which
has dD(CF pB σ CF
p
A, CF ) > 3. From the triangle inequality we know that one of the three following
conditions must hold
dD(ΠAΠB, CF ) > , (12)
dD(ΠAσACF pA,ΠAΠB) > , (13)
dD(CF pBσBσACF
p
A,ΠAσACF
p
A) > . (14)
If it is (12) that holds, we are done, since we have a trivial distinguisher that can break the condition
from Fig. 8a. If it is either (13) or (14), then using the contractivity rule, we find that either DΠA can
distinguish the left and right-hand sides of Fig. 8b or σACF pAD can distinguish the left and right-hand
sides of Fig. 8c.
Thus, both the computational requirements and memory requirements of the distinguisher are the
same as the computational and memory requirements of either ΠA or σACF pA.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completely general and applies to quantum and non-signalling protocols
as well. The apparent “classicality” of the proof is due to the fact that all inputs and outputs are classical
bits as per the definition of the resources used. However, we only talk about the input-output correlations
produced by the simulator σ and not the internal machinery used to produce these correlations, which
could be classical, quantum or non-signalling and the impossibility holds for all classical, quantum and
non-signalling strategies that σ could adopt to produce these correlations. A particular input-output
correlation could be generated through many different strategies but it turns out in this particular case
that there exists a simple classical strategy that perfectly produces these correlations (look at the value of
c and set b = b′ = c all the time), which is why we use correlations produced by σ and strategy adopted
by σ quite interchangeably. But one must keep in mind that this in no way restricts the simulator to
classical strategies.
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B.3 Impossibility of extending delays
Theorem 7 (Impossibility of extending CD). Given n channels with delay CD1,...,CDn between two
parties, it is impossible to construct with  ≤ 18 a channel CD′ between the two parties with a trusted
region that is larger than the trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols ΠA,ΠB in C, which includes inefficient and non-signalling systems. The
distinguisher needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as
the protocol ΠA,ΠB. In particular, if it is efficient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore,
if the channels constructed and used are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantum
memory requirements as the protocol ΠA,ΠB.
Proof. Let CD1, . . . , CDn denote the n given channels with CDi = (CDi, CDiA, CDiB) and associated
locations Pi ≺ P ′i ≺ Q′i ≺ Qi. Our goal is to construct a channel CD′, characterized by points
PI ≺ P ′I ≺ P ′F ≺ PF , given those channels and additional (direct) communication taking place in a
space-time region R. The conditions given in Fig. 10 must be satisfied such that  is a small, non-
negative number ∀ distinguishers D ∈ D. In the following we write CD = CD1‖ · · · ‖CDn to denote
the resource consisting of the parallel composition of the n resources CDi that are available to Alice
and Bob (similarly CDA and CDB for dishonest Alice and Bob respectively).
Note that for each channel with delay, there exists a converter δiA such that δiACDiA = CDi: this
is simply a system that takes the input a from Alice at position Pi and outputs it at position P ′i . Let
δA = δ1A‖ · · · ‖δnA denote the parallel composition of these converters such that δACDA = CD.
From Fig. 10c we have
CDA ΠB ≈ σA CD′A =⇒ ΠA δA CDA ΠB ≈ ΠA δA σACD′A
⇐⇒ ΠA CD ΠB ≈ ΠA δA σA CD′A (15)
If we look at the right-hand side of (15), the joint system ΠAδAσA produces an output at position P ′I ,
but nothing after. Hence, communication that does not reach σA before P ′I cannot influence the output
and is not relevant to the output of ΠAδAσA. Let ⊥A denote a converter that blocks all channels CDi
with P ′i ⊀ P ′I and also blocks all communication in the region R at points P ⊀ P ′I . We then have
ΠA⊥AδAσA = ΠAδAσA. Combining this with Fig. 10c, (15), and Fig. 10a, we get
ΠA⊥AδACDAΠB ≈ ΠA⊥AδAσACD′A = ΠAδAσACD′A ≈ ΠACDΠB ≈ CD′,
from which we conclude that
ΠA⊥ACDΠB ≈3 CD′. (16)
We now turn our attention to Fig. 10b. Similarly to the argument above, we define a converter δB
such that CDBδB = CD and a converter ⊥B that blocks exactly the same channels and points as ⊥A,
but which is plugged into Bob’s interface. We then get from Fig. 10b that
ΠACDBδB⊥BΠB ≈ CD′BσBδB⊥BΠB. (17)
If we look at the left-hand side of (17), we see that CDBδB⊥B = CD⊥B = ⊥ACD, hence it follows
from (16) and (17) that
CD′BσBδB⊥BΠB ≈4 CD′. (18)
(18) can only hold with  < 1/8 if information flows from the left interface of CD′B to the right
interface of ΠB. Communication between CD′B and σB only occurs in position P ′F , so for the message
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CD1
.
.
.
CDn
CD′
(a1, P1) (a1, Q1)
(an, Pn) (an, Qn)
(b, R)
(a, PI) (a, PF ) (a, PI) (a, PF )
ΠA ΠB
≈
(a) ΠACD1 ‖ ... ‖ CDnΠB ≈ CD′
CD1B
.
.
.
CDnB
CD′B
(a1, P1) (a1, Q′1)
(an, Pn) (an, Q′n)
(b, R)
(a, PI) (a, PI) (a, P ′F )
(a1, Q′1)
.
.
.
(an, Q′n)
(b, R)
ΠA
σB
≈
(b) ∃σB such that ΠACD1B ‖ ... ‖ CDnB ≈ CD′B σB.
CDnA
CD′A
CD1A
.
.
.
(a1, P ′1) (a1, Q1)
(an, P ′n) (an, Qn)
(b, R)
(a, PF ) (a, P ′I) (a, PF )
(a1, P ′1)
.
.
.
(an, P ′n)
(b, R)
ΠB
σA
≈
(c) ∃σA such that CD1A ‖ ... ‖ CDnAΠB ≈ σA CD′A.
Figure 10: Conditions for building a channel with delay CD′ out of n channels with delay CD1, . . . , CDn.
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to make its way through to ΠB, there must also be communication between σB and ΠB at some point
P  P ′F . The region R cannot be used for this, as P ′I ≺ P ′F and ⊥B blocks all communication after P ′I .
The only remaining option is for there to exist a channel CDi with Q′i  P ′F and which is not blocked
by ⊥B, i.e., P ′i ≺ P ′I . But in this case we would have P ′i ≺ P ′I ≺ P ′F ≺ Q′i, i.e., the trusted region of
CDi would contain the trusted region of CD′.
To finish the proof, we still need to analyze the complexity of the distinguisher used to distinguish
the real and ideal systems. The proof assumes that the protocol is secure, and then concludes that
(18) must hold, which implies that the trusted region of the constructed channel must be contained
in the trusted region of one of the assumed channels. Taking the contrapositive, we assume that the
constructed CD′ has a larger trusted region than the assumed channels, which implies that there exists a
distinguisher that can distinguisher the left and right-hand sides of (18), which in turn implies that there
exists a distinguisher that can distinguisher the real from ideal in one of the equations from Fig. 10. We
will now go through the arguments of the proof to determine the complexity of this distinguisher that
we have proven to exist.
The systems on the left and right-hand sides of (18) just take a message as input and output a
message of the same dimension. CD′ performs an identity operation on the value of the message,
whereas CD′BσBδB⊥BΠB must trace out the input and output some fixed state, since by assumption
CD′ has a larger trusted region than the assumed channels, so there is no communication from Alice’s
interface to Bob’s interface. If the channel is classical, an optimal system that distinguishes a fixed
(possibly probabilistic) output from the identity channel, inputs a fixed message (that has low probability
of being output by the channel on the left-hand side of (18)), and checks to see if the same message is
output. This has probability of success at least 1/2, and requires no memory and one equality check.
If the channel is quantum, the distinguisher may perform the same (which then involves preparing one
quantum state and performing a projective measurement). Alternatively, the distinguisher may input
half of an EPR pair, keep the purification, and perform the projective measurement on the joint system
of the output and the purification, which has a probability of success of at least 3/4, but now involves
quantum memory of the size of the message.
There are two generic arguments used in the proof to construct the distinguisher for one of the
equations in Fig. 10 from the distinguisher for (18). The first is the triangle inequality, namely that
R ≈ε S
S ≈ε T
}
=⇒ R ≈2ε T.
Note that this holds for individual distinguishers, hence the contrapositive states that if there exists a
distinguisher that can distinguish R from T with advantage 2ε, then exactly the same distinguisher can
distinguish either R from S or S from T with advantage ε.
The second generic argument uses the fact that for any resources R,S and any converter α,
R ≈ε S =⇒ αR ≈ε αS.
Unlike the previous argument, this one involves a change of distinguisher, namely if for some D,
dD(αR,αS) > ε, then dDα(R,S) > ε, where Dα corresponds to the composition of D with α.
This was used several times in the proof with α = ΠA⊥AδA, α = ΠAδA, and α = δB⊥BΠB. Putting
this together, we prove that there exists a distinguisher than can distinguish at least one of the pairs
of systems from Fig. 10, and this distinguisher has the same computational requirements as either ΠA
or ΠB along with one extra measurement needed to distinguish the left and right-hand sides of (18)
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CF ufB
(co ∈ {c,⊥}, P )
(c, P1)
(b ∈ {⊥,⊥}, P2)Alice Bob
P1 ≺ P2 ≺ P
Figure 11: An unfair coin flip resource with honest Alice and dishonest Bob.
(since δ and ⊥ and forward and trace out messages, respectively, they do not perform any computa-
tion). Furthermore, if the channels are classical, then the distinguisher has the same quantum memory
requirements as either ΠA or ΠB, since δ and ⊥ do not require any quantum memory.
C Unfair resources
C.1 Unfair coin flipping
In Section 2.3.1, we defined the p-biased coin flipping resource tuple CFp = {CF,CF pA, CF pB}. Here we
define another variation, the unfair coin flipping resource tuple CFuf and prove that a 1/2-biased coin
flip resource CF1/2 can be constructed from it. Then, by reduction, Theorem 4 implies the impossibility
of unfair coin flipping solely through the exchange of messages.
Definition 11 (Unfair coin flipping, CFuf). An unfair coin flip CFuf = (CF,CF ufA , CF ufB ) has the same
resource CF as CFp, and CF ufA and CF ufB are given by:
CF ufB : Bob receives a uniformly random bit c at location P1. At location P2  P1, he can input a bit
b ∈ {⊥,⊥} that may depend on the value of c received at P1. Alice then receives message cAo at
the location P  P2 depending on Bob’s input b at P2: if b =⊥, then cAo =⊥, else cAo = c i.e.,
dishonest Bob can prompt an abort (⊥) on Alice’s interface by setting b =⊥.
CF ufA : analogous to CF
p
B, with the roles reversed.
This is illustrated in Fig. 11.
Lemma 10. There exists a protocol ΠCFuf→CF1/2 = {Π′A,Π′B} that perfectly constructs a 1/2-biased
coin flipping resource CF1/2 from an unfair coin flipping resource CFuf.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including
quantum and non-signalling distinguishers). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only
elementary local operations and classical communication.
Proof. We define the honest protocol ΠCFuf→CF1/2 = {Π′A,Π′B} as follows:
1. Receive the coin flip outcome from the corresponding interface of the unfair coin flipping resource
CFuf at the inner interface.
2. If this outcome has a bit value (say c), output c at the outer interface. If this outcome is an abort
(⊥), then output cu = 0 or cu = 1 each with probability p = 1/2 at the outer interface.
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ΠCFuf→CF1/2 perfectly constructs a 1/2-biased coin flipping resource for the following simulators
(the same for SimA and SimB):
1. Receive the output bit c′ from the biased coin flipping resource on the inner interface and output
the same bit at the outer interface.
2. Upon receiving the additional input of ⊥ or ⊥ at the outer interface, forward b′ = c′ to the
resource at the inner interface if this input is not an abort (⊥) and forward b′ = c¯′ = c′ ⊕ 1 to
the resource if the input at the outer interface is an abort (⊥).
One can easily verify that the real and ideal systems are identical, for convenience, we have drawn
this in Figure 12.
C.2 Abort channel
In Sec. 2.3.3, a CD is defined such that once Alice inputs her message at P (respectively, P ′, if she is
dishonest), Bob is guaranteed to receive it at Q (or Q′ if he is dishonest). In this section we consider a
version of a channel with delay in which Alice may additionally abort, and prevent Bob from getting her
message. We call this an abort channel, and write CD⊥.
Definition 12 (Abort channel, CD⊥). An abort channel CD⊥ = (CD,CD⊥A , CDB) between a sender
Alice and a receiver Bob is a tuple of resources characterized by five space-time locations, P ≺ P ′ ≺
R ≺ Q′ ≺ Q. CD and CDB are defined identically to a standard CD (Definition 5). CD⊥A is defined
as follows
CD⊥A : Dishonest Alice inputs (a, P ′). She may also input (⊥, R). If she input (⊥, R), Bob does not
receive anything. Otherwise, Bob receives (a,Q).
Nearly the same protocol as used in Theorem 3 can be used to construct an unfair coin flip from an
abort channel.
Lemma 11 (Construction CD⊥ → CFuf). Given a classical abort channel CD⊥, there exists a classical
protocol ΠCD⊥→CFuf = {ΠA,ΠB} that perfectly constructs an unfair coin flipping resource CFuf.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including
quantum and non-signalling distinguishers). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only
elementary local operations and classical communication.
Proof. The protocol is the same as the one used to construct CF0 from CD, except that if Bob does not
receive anything from the channel, he outputs ⊥ instead of picking a uniform a himself. The simulator
σA has to be changed in the same way: if it does not receive an input (a,A′) or if it recives (a,A′), but
later gets an abort ⊥ (which is now allowed by CD⊥), it notifies the resource CF⊥A to abort and output
⊥ at Bob’s interface. Drawing up a figure similar to Fig. 7, one can see that here too we have perfect
security.
It then follows from Theorem 4 that an abort channel cannot be constructed without any setup
assumptions either.
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c c
CF uf CF 1/2
c c c′ c′
if ⊥,
cu
if ⊥,
cu
ΠA ΠB
≈0
(a) When both parties are honest, the outcomes of the unfair resource CF uf are never equal to ⊥ and the
protocols ΠA and ΠB simply forward the bit c received at the inner interface to their outer interface. This is a
perfect construction since the honest resources CF uf and CF 1/2 are the same.
{c,⊥}
SimB
c
{⊥,⊥}CF uf CF
1/2
B
{c, cu} {c′, b′}
c′
b′
c′
{⊥,⊥}
if ⊥,
cu
⊥⇒ b′ = c¯′
⊥ ⇒ b′ = c′
ΠA
≈0
(b) The simulator SimB for dishonest Bob simply forwards c′ received at its inner interface to its outer interface
and sets b′ = c′ if it receives ⊥ at the outer interface and b′ = c¯′ otherwise. Now the protocol ΠA may also
receive the abort input ⊥ from the unfair CF resource, in which case it forwards the uniformly random bit cu
which equals either 0 or 1 each with probability 1/2 and simply forwards the input c from the unfair CF resource
otherwise. The construction is perfect because the probability distribution of inputs and outputs from the real
system is the same as the input and output probability distribution of the ideal system and hence the two are
perfectly indistinguishable. More specifically, whenever a dishonest player does not abort, the outputs at both
interfaces will be equal to an independently generated, uniformly random bit (labelled as c for the real system
and c′ for the ideal system. If the dishonest player aborts, the two outputs will be equal to an independently
generated, uniformly random bit (c or c′) with a probability of 1/2 and they will be uniformly random but
completely uncorrelated (cu and c for the real system and b′ and c′ for the ideal system) with a probability of
1/2. The argument for dishonest Alice is identical.
Figure 12: Constructibility of a 1/2-biased CF resource from an unfair CF resource. We have dropped
the space-time labels corresponding to the messages to avoid unnecessary annotations, but it is easy
to see that there exist space-time labels for each message involved such that the above construction is
satisfied.
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Corollary 12 (Impossibility of CD⊥). It is impossible to construct CD⊥, with  < 112 , between two
mutually distrusting parties solely through the exchange of messages through any classical, quantum or
relativistic protocol.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity and
memory requirements as the distinguisher used in Theorem 4 composed with the protocols used in
Lemmas 10 and 11. In particular, if these are efficient, classical and have bounded or noisy memory,
then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. Lemma 11 constructs CFuf from CD⊥, and Lemma 10 constructs CF1/2 from CFuf. Thus, the
impossiblity of constructing CFp from Theorem 4 immediately implies the impossibility of constructing
CD⊥.
Finally, we can show that Theorem 7 also holds for abort channels.
Lemma 13 (Impossibility of extending CD⊥). Given n abort channels with delay CD⊥1 ,...,CD⊥n between
two parties, it is impossible to construct with  ≤ 18 a channel CD′⊥ between the two parties with a
trusted region that is larger than the trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols ΠA,ΠB in C, which includes inefficient and non-signalling systems. The
distinguisher needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as
the protocolΠA,ΠB. In particular, if it is efficient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore,
if the channels constructed and used are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantum
memory requirements as the protocol ΠA,ΠB.
The proof of Lemma 13 is identical to the proof of Theorem 7 found in Appendix B.3, because the
distinguisher used runs the honest protocol PiA, P iB, and CD and CD⊥ only differ on the adversarial
interface (a dishonest Alice can provoke an abort). So we omit it.
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